This paper thinks about the job of organization regulation with regards to financialization, with an emphasis on investor supremacy. After an itemized survey of the provenance of the putative investor supremacy reasoning, the review gives an examination of significant parts of the Organization Regulation Survey process in the UK. This at last prompted the Organizations Act 2006 which confirmed that investor supremacy would be kept up with as a critical rule of UK organization regulation. The CLR had brought up the focal issue: 'in whose interests should organizations be run?' and set forward two other options: one in light of investor power, and the other in view of adjusting the interests of a scope of partners. The two options were depicted as 'edified investor worth' and 'pluralism'. Attracting on interviews with key members the CLR cycle, discoveries from this study propose that: the expansiveness of mastery and assessment addressed on the CLR was fairly thin; there was an assumption for the state of affairs of investor power; there was an absence of any significant conversation of the other options and that next to zero thought was given to relative worldwide proof. Truth is told; a few key members communicated a lot of wariness about the worth of the cycle. The new type of words overseeing chiefs' obligations, which at long last arisen in regulation, was figured by some to implant the idea of investor power more immovably than previously-ostensibly mirroring the course of financialization.